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Despite reform efforts, the economic performance of Latin American countries 
during the 1990s was disappointing with the exception of Chile, which grew at 
almost 7% per year. This paper tries to explain this difference. Following recent 
literature that highlights the role played by institutions and policies on economic 
growth, we estimate a cross-section econometric model over the 1960-2005 period 
and find that Chile’s better performance can largely be explained by a combination 
of better institutions and reforms that have been deeper and broader in scope than 
those in the rest of Latin America. In addition, we estimate that improving institutions 
in other Latin American countries to the Chilean standard would have increased 
per-capita GDP growth rates by about one and a half percentage points.
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1.  Introduction
Latin American countries grew steadily at about 5% per year in the three 
decades after World War II. But this process did not last long as it was interrupted 
by the debt crisis of the early 1980s, during which most countries in the region 
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went into recession (Table 1). The crisis brought to the surface the structural 
problems, both macro and micro, existing at the time in most Latin American 
economies. Consequently, almost every country in the region spent the rest of the 
decade revising and amending their policies and implementing reforms aimed at 
changing the development model followed until then.
TABLE 1
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES DURING THE DEBT CRISIS











Costa Rica –13.4 –2.2
Dominican Republic –7.2 3.2
Ecuador –7.1 –0.8









Sources: IMF, World Bank.
Following the debt crisis, the old import-substitution cum government 
intervention model began to be replaced by market-oriented economies, where 
resource allocation was to be driven mainly by private initiative and market 
forces. Thus, during the second part of the 1980s –the so-called lost decade–, 
Latin American countries, one after another, began dismantling tariffs and other 
trade barriers, reducing fiscal deficits, fighting inflation, liberalizing prices and 
interest rates, lifting credit restrictions, privatizing state owned enterprises, and 
reducing government intervention in the economy. The aim was to achieve greater 
integration with the rest of the world, both in goods & services and in financial 
flows. In the new development model the government was supposed to play a 
complementary role and focus its attention only on the provision of public goods 
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supervisory framework– while providing basic services to the poor –health care 
and education. Expectations were that by adopting the new model and implement-
ing the policies recommended by the International Financial Institutions –the so 
wrongly called Washington Consensus (Williamson, 2003)– countries would start 
growing again on a sustained basis. Social indicators would improve across the 
board and income inequality would be reduced.
After a decade of reforms, economic growth resumed, but the overall out-
come fell short of expectations: average growth during the 1990s, for the region 
as a whole, attained 3.3% and has since remained below the average of the three 
decades after WW II. Further, the region was not immune to crises (Mexico 
1994-95, Ecuador 1999, Argentina 2001) and was also adversely affected by the 
1997-98 financial turmoil. In addition, although there was an improvement in 
social indicators like literacy or infant mortality, the drop in poverty was very 
marginal, and the per capita income gap with industrial countries broadened in 
most countries. These results have been the cause of disillusionment with, and 
the so-called fatigue of, the reform process.
The exception to all of the above was Chile. The country not only grew 
steadily during thirteen years after the debt crisis at a much higher rate than in 
previous decades –annual growth during 1985-97 averaged 7.3%–, but it was less 
affected by the turmoil of the late 1990s. And although growth averaged only 
2.6% during 1998-2003, it returned to 5.2% in 2004-2006. In addition, during the 
1990s the inflation rate fell to single digits, social indicators –except for income 
distribution– improved significantly (poverty fell by as much as 16 percentage 
points) and the per capita income gap with industrial countries was reduced by 
about 30%.
The contrasting experience of Chile vis-à-vis the rest of the region has 
not gone unnoticed. In fact, many researchers and policymakers have searched 
for explanations and, in the process, pointed out to specific factors that distin-
guish Chile from the rest of the region. Potential candidates among these factors 
include the depth and extent of the reform process –Chile started its reform in 
the mid-1970s, about a decade earlier than Mexico, the second country to begin 
reforms. The pension system reform of the early 1980s has also been singled out 
as an explanation as it provides a large savings base and reduces the country’s 
dependency on foreign savings to finance investment. And some have argued that 
capital controls played a role –especially the so-called encaje (unremunerated re-
serve requirement)– during the 1990s, when private capital returned to the region, 
because they reduced the country’s dependency on short-term and volatile flows, 
thus making it less prone to capital flight and contagion effects.
Although all the factors above have most likely played a role, there is at 
least one complementary explanation for the different economic performance 
of Chile and other Latin American countries. This is based on the most recent 
literature on economic growth that suggests that the ultimate cause of a country’s 
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protection, governance, lack of corruption and bureaucracy, rule of law, and the 
like– lead to the design of better policies and, therefore, allow countries to attain 
faster economic growth. Alternatively, for the same set of policies, better institu-
tions allow countries to reap off greater benefits in terms of growth. Thus, the 
argument follows; Chile has been able to grow faster than other Latin American 
countries since the late 1980s, although facing the same external environment and 
shocks, mainly thanks to its better institutions.
This paper attempts to evaluate the statement above. That is, we try to 
find an explanation for Chile’s different performance since the mid-1980s, with a 
focus on quantifying –to the extent possible by data availability– the contribution 
of different factors. We find that, as expected, both policies and the quality of the 
country’s institutions influenced the outcome in terms of growth. In particular, 
we find that the better performance of Chile vis-à-vis Latin America during the 
1990s, is explained by both better policies and better institutions in almost equal 
shares –during the 1990s, per-capita GDP in Chile grew annually by about 3.2% 
more than in the rest of Latin America, about half of which is explained by better 
policies and half by better institutions. With regards to specific economic policies, 
we find that keeping an overvalued real exchange rate, as some Latin American 
countries did, is consistently detrimental to growth. In addition, the reforms to 
the pension system in 1981 and to the banking sector in 1986 were critical to 
foster the development of the financial sector and thus contributed to accelerate 
growth in Chile.
This paper is an attempt to put together the conclusions of two branches of 
the literature, one that studies and draw policy lessons from the reform process in 
Latin America (IDB 1997, Lora 2001; Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 1997), and 
another that tries to explain economic growth using large data sets, which lately 
has emphasized the role of institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 
2002; Easterly and Levine, 2003). Using Chile as a counterfactual, we are able to 
quantify the benefits –in terms of increased economic growth– to be reaped–off 
by other Latin American countries of adopting better policies and improving the 
quality of their institutions.
At least two policy conclusions emerge from our analysis. First, countries 
that are behind in the reform process compared to, say, Chile or Mexico that started 
earlier, can benefit and attain higher economic growth if they continue making 
progress in the so-called first generation reforms. Second, beyond economic re-
forms, countries would benefit by improving their institutions, which by nature 
are much more persistent but, nevertheless, can be changed, as countries are not 
condemned to live with the institutions inherited from previous generations. This 
means that countries should not cease in their efforts to reform their institutional 
setup, even though the benefits materialize much later than in the case of eco-
nomic policies, because the payoff is quite large. Institutional buildup should be 
a continuos effort, like it has been in Chile that for over three decades has been 
reforming its institutions and continues doing so.Economic Reforms, Financial Development and Growth 63
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes 
the reform process in Latin America in the past 25 years, highlighting the areas 
where most and least progress has been made. Section 3 summarizes the economic 
and social performance of Latin American economies since World War II. Based 
on previous work by others, section 4 evaluates the reforms implemented in the 
region, that is, it provides an overall assessment of what did and did not work. 
Section 5 looks into Chile’s reforms in greater detail. It advances an explanation 
of Chile’s better performance by analyzing in detail the existing differences in 
both policies and quality of institutions between Chile and the rest of the region. 
Next, section 6 quantifies the relative contribution to economic growth of each 
set of factors –policies and quality of institutions. In this section we examine the 
role played by specific reforms and policies in fostering growth, in particular 
the pension reform, the banking sector reform and the reduction of inflation. By 
explaining economic growth on a quantitative basis, this section provides an as-
sessment of the potential benefits that a typical Latin American country would 
obtain after improving the institutional set–up and advancing in the economic 
reform process. Finally, section 7 concludes and discusses the challenges ahead 
for most countries in the region.
2.  Economic Reform in Latin America: Where Do We 
Stand?
The Latin American region, which grew steadily at about 5% per year during 
the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, was severely hit by the debt crisis of the early 1980s. 
Prior to the crisis, almost every country, and especially the largest –Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico–, had borrowed heavily in the international capital markets. 
Thus, after running large current account deficits for a few years, these countries 
were severely affected when monetary policy shifted in the US and international 
interest rates were raised causing a global slowdown (Table 1).
The crisis uncovered the major imbalances and structural problems that 
existed in most countries in the region at the time, and set the stage for the reform 
process that occurred in the following years. The reforms were aimed first at at-
taining macroeconomic stability and reducing government deficits. Beyond that, 
the main goal was to replace the old import substitution cum government inter-
vention development model that had been in place for several decades. Instead, 
countries opted for developing outward oriented economies where market forces, 
as opposed to government actions, would play a major role in allocating resources 
among competing sectors.
Starting with Mexico in the mid 1980s, one after another Latin American 
countries began implementing the same reforms that Chile had introduced in 
1974-75 and thereafter. These included a program to reestablish macro stability, 
comprising a devaluation of the currency, a tightening of monetary policy and 64 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
a fiscal adjustment with cuts in subsidies and non-essential programs. The aim 
was threefold: to reduce the fiscal deficit, to balance the external accounts and 
to fight inflation.
In addition, countries began reducing both the level and the dispersion of 
trade tariffs while lifting other non–tariff barriers to trade and unifying multiple 
exchange rate systems. Trade integration took two forms; some countries opted 
for unilateral tariff reductions –like Chile had done in the 1970s– while others pre-
ferred trade agreements and the establishment of trade areas within the region like 
Mercosur, which in its first stage included only four countries, namely, Argentina, 
Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. Also, countries implemented tax reforms whereby 
the VAT was introduced –Chile introduced the VAT in 1975– and some taxes were 
raised to compensate for the reductions in trade tariffs.
The reform process comprised three other areas, namely, financial liber-
alization, privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs), and the labor market. 
Financial sector reforms included lifting restrictions on credit allocation, abolish-
ing ceilings on interest rates, and reducing reserve requirements on banks. The 
aim was to end the era of financial repression so that credit could be allocated to 
its most productive and profitable uses among competing economic sectors. In 
addition, state owned banks were privatized to improve their efficiency. Similarly, 
the privatization of SOEs sought to attract more investment and attain higher 
levels of efficiency in the use of resources. Along the way, the privatization of 
banks and enterprises would provide extraordinary funds for the government that 
would help to resolve debt problems. Finally, labor market reforms were aimed 
at increasing labor mobility and wage flexibility. Main objectives were to reduce 
the cost of firing by cutting severance payments and to abolish automatic salary 
adjustments to past inflation.
As mentioned, the goals of the reforms were to reestablish macro stability 
and to replace the old development model that was based on import substitution 
and widespread government intervention in the economy. The latter occurred 
through price controls, mandatory credit allocation, financial repression, subsidies 
to specific industries and exchange controls, among other measures, and was the 
cause of governments running large fiscal deficits, high inflation rates and endemic 
balance of payments deficits. In addition, labor legislation was overprotective and 
tended to reduce mobility and flexibility.
In the new market oriented development model the government relinquishes 
from the production and distribution of private goods that can be produced more 
efficiently by the private sector. Instead, it focuses on the provision of public 
goods –e.g. safety, judiciary system– and, most importantly, implementing social 
programs to alleviate poverty and improve the access of the poor to basic services 
such as health care and education. But in the new model, education and health 
care services do not have to be provided necessarily by the government; the poor, 
with financial support from the government, can buy these services from a private 
provider. In addition, in the new model the government does play a crucial role in 
market regulation and supervision. This comprises not only the financial sector 
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The aim is to develop and maintain a competitive environment in all industries and 
sectors, and entails setting rates for natural monopolies such as utilities, strength-
ening the role of consumer protection agencies, promoting market discipline and 
assuring free entry to all economic sectors.
Although the breadth and timing of the reform processes differ across 
countries, it is worth trying to assess the degree of progress achieved throughout 
the region. As said, Chile made significant progress in several areas in the 1970s 
(few other countries did so in some areas), but the bulk of the reforms in the region 
were implemented after the debt crisis. Figure 1 shows indicators of progress 
made in several areas as well as an indicator of general progress. All indicators 
are constructed to measure progress made since 1985. Although these indicators 
are subject to many caveats1, they are indicative of the reform effort in the region 
as a whole. The figure shows that much progress occurred in trade liberaliza-
tion, especially up to the Tequila Crisis, and significant progress occurred in the 
financial sector, although it was more evenly spanned through time2. Conversely, 
little progress has been made in tax reform and in the privatization of state owned 
enterprises, and no progress at all in the labor market. Thus, a lot remains to be 
done in Latin America in the last three areas.
FIGURE 1
PROGRESS IN THE REFORM PROCESS OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
Note: Progress in reform is measured as the usage (in percent) in each date, of the total potential room 
for reform available in 1985. The potential available in 1985 is measured by the difference with the 
most liberalized country in the whole sample in each of the sub components. Source: Lora (2001).
1 The indices measure, for each area, how liberalized is each country compared to the least liberalized 
country in the whole sample. The sample period is 1985-99 in Lora (2001) and 1970-95 in Morley et 
al. (1999). For more details see Lora, 2001; Lora and Barrera 1997; and Morley et al., 1999.
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3.  Latin America’s Economic and Social Performance
In the past 43 years, Latin America’s economic performance has varied 
significantly from one period to another, in contrast to the experience of East 
Asia. Further, on average Latin America grew at about 60% the rate of East Asia 
for the whole 1960-2005 period, and has not yet recovered the rates of growth 
attained in the 1960s and 1970s, despite the recovery witnessed shortly into the 
reform process (Figure 2).
FIGURE 2
ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES (%)
(1960-2005)
Note: East Asia includes China, Hong-Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
Source: World Bank, WDI (2007).
Among all Latin American countries, Chile is the only one that in the past 
eighteen years has grown at average rates comparable to those attained by the East 
Asian economies. Chile’s growth rate in 1990-2000 was very similar to that of 
South Korea, and between South Korea’s and Indonesia’s in 1985-97. Costa Rica, 
the Latin American country that comes second after Chile in terms of growth, grew 
at a much lower rate –about 2.5% less per year (Table 2). Consequently, among 
all Latin American countries, Chile is the only one that, along with the emerging 
market economies from East Asia, in the past quarter century has closed its per-
capita GDP gap with the industrial countries –Chile closed this gap in about 30% 
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TABLE 2































El Salvador 2.7 3.3
Peru 2.7 3.4








Trinidad and Tobago -0.1 3.1
Nicaragua -0.2 3.0
Haiti -0.4 0.3
Source: IMF.68 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
FIGURE 3
RELATIVE PER-CAPITA GDP
Per capita GDP in each country as a fraction of US per capita GDP, normalized 1960 = 1
Source: Own elaboration.
Chile’s good performance also shows up in its social indicators. The most 
outstanding achievement in the case of Chile has been poverty reduction; in the 
past 10 years the country has halved its poverty rate –it went from 33% in the 
early 1990s, down to 17% in 2000 (Table 3). In contrast, poverty reduction in the 
region at large has been modest –from 41% to 36%– while in some countries it has 
increased. It is worth noting that according to Attanassio and Székely (2001), about 
85 percent of the poverty reduction in Chile can be attributed to high economic 
growth, while only 7 percent resulted from redistribution policies3.
In sum, in the 1990s, economic growth resumed in the region but remained 
below the pre-debt-crisis rates, widening the per-capita income gap with industrial 
countries. At the same time, poverty reduction was modest, other social indicators 
improved and income distribution worsened. In sharp contrast, Chile’s growth 
rate during the decade was one of the highest around the world, becoming the 
only Latin America country that converged in per-capita-income terms to the 
industrial countries4.
3 The results from Attanassio and Székely (2001) refer to the drop in poverty between 1987 and 1996. 
According to these authors, about 8% of the drop in poverty is a residual and cannot be explained 
by their model.
4 Although it is not the topic of this paper, it is important to comment that one area in which Chile has 
not been successful is in altering its income distribution. Thus, not only income distribution deterio-
rated in Latin America in the past 30 years, becoming one of the worst in the world, but with a Gini 
coefficient above 0.55 Chile’s income distribution is one of the worst in the region. The link between 
growth and income distribution is not as clear as the link between growth and poverty. For improving 
income distribution it is necessary to implement social policies focalized in the poorest group, and 
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TABLE 3
POVERTY INDICATORS OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
Poverty1 Indigence2
Household Population Household Population
Early 90s Current3 Early 90s Current3 Early 90s Current3 Early 90s Current3
Argentina 16 32 21 42 4 12 5 19
Bolivia 49 56 53 62 22 32 23 37
Brazil 41 30 48 38 18 10 23 13
Chile 33 17 39 21 11 5 13 6
Colombia 47 45 53 51 25 21 29 24
Costa Rica 24 19 26 20 10 8 10 8
Ecuador 56 43 62 49 23 16 26 19
Honduras  75 71 81 77 54 47 61 54
Mexico 39 32 48 39 14 9 19 13
Nicaragua 68 63 74 59 43 36 48 42
Paraguay 37 52 43 61 10 27 13 33
Uruguay 12 9 18 15 2 1 3 3
Venezuela 34 43 40 49 12 20 14 22
Latin America 41 36 48 44 18 15 23 19
Source: ECLAC (2004).
Notes:
1 Poor is a  household with per-capita income below the poverty line or minimum income to satisfy its 
essential necessities. The poverty line is calculated with the basic necessities cost method.
2 Indigent is a household with per-capita income below the indigence line or minimum income to 
satisfy its essential nutritional necessities.
3 Stands either for 2000, 2001 or 2002, depending on the country. In Chile it corresponds to 2000.
This brief revision of the economic and social performance of Latin 
American economies raises several questions, in particular: Did the structural 
reforms implemented during the 1980s and 1990s have any effect on countries’ 
performance? What did Chile do differently that explains its better results? The 
next two sections try to answer these questions by first summarizing previous 
findings and then exploring in greater detail the reform process in Chile. Section 
IV provides an overall assessment of why Latin American countries did not attain 
higher growth on a sustained basis, while Section V advances an explanation of 
Chile’s better performance by analyzing in detail the differences with the rest of 
the region in both policies and quality of institutions.
4.  The Reform Process and Its Results: An Assessment
Early attempts at evaluating the reform processes in Latin America concluded 
that reforming countries reaped large benefits from them. The initial estimates 
concluded that the reforms implemented in the region up to the mid-nineties ac-
celerated growth by about 2% per year (Easterly et al., 1997; Fernandez-Arias 
and Montiel, 1997). But these results were subsequently contested by new 
analyses that looked into longer time series. Nevertheless, more recent literature 
that revisits the issue concludes that the reforms indeed contributed to acceler-70 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
ate growth, although the effects were rather transitory, implying that to achieve 
a higher growth rate on a sustained basis countries should continue the reform 
process. Thus, for instance, according to Lora et al. (2002) Latin America grew 
about 1.3% faster during 1991-93 because of the reform effort, but only about 
0.6% faster in 1997-99 both because the effects of previous reforms faded away 
and because the reform effort declined.
At least four other important conclusions emerge from the literature. First, 
results were unsatisfactory in some countries because of an insufficient reform 
effort; in other words, growth did not accelerate in those countries not because 
reforms failed, but because they were incomplete, either in scope or in depth 
(Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 1997). Second, the pay-off from the reforms 
depends on institutions. Thus, for instance, according to Lora et al. (2002), re-
forms were more effective in countries with good rule of law. Third, reforms are 
complementary; i.e., the pay-off from, say, the trade reform –in terms of faster 
economic growth– was higher in countries with a more developed financial sector 
(Gallego and Loayza, 2002). And finally, reforms tended to affect growth mainly 
through increases in total factor productivity, TFP, rather than through factor ac-
cumulation (Lora et al., 2002).
The four results above are consistent with each other if one notes that the 
main source of growth in recent decades has shifted from factor accumulation to 
TPF, that is, doing things better (not just doing more of the same by hiring more 
labor and capital). Beyer and Vergara (2002) decompose the growth of a large (107) 
sample of countries during 1980-2000, and conclude that about 82 percent of the 
growth difference between the 10 percent –best and the 10%– worst performers 
can be explained by changes in TFP, while only 18 percent is explained by faster 
factor accumulation5.
In an era of rapid technological change, rapidly growing firms are constantly 
trying to improve procedures and attain greater efficiency by incorporating and adapt-
ing new technologies. For this to occur, a necessary condition is that prices reflect 
the actual cost of providing different goods and services, which can be achieved by 
liberalizing prices and implementing several other market-oriented policies. In other 
words, what is needed is to reduce state intervention in the economy (except for 
externalities and other market failures that require the state to intervene). But this is 
not enough. Also, the business environment must be such that the private sector has 
the incentives to invest in the development and implementation of new and better 
technologies; that is, the business environment must be conducive to agents to get 
involved in constantly improving their efficiency levels. For this, stable rules of the 
game and good institutions are needed. Among the latter are rule of law, property 
rights protection, absence of corruption, and low bureaucracy6.
5 It is possible to provide a different interpretation of this result. In particular, given the way they com-
puted the contribution to growth of ∆L, ∆K and ∆TFP, the latter element captures not only efficiency 
gains but also other unidentified shocks (“bad or good luck”). Therefore, it could be argued that the 
best performers, those countries showing a higher contribution of ∆TFP, are those more resilient to 
shocks (where negative shocks were less harmful). This resilience may, in turn, be a direct result of 
better institutions and policies.
6 Note that this explanation does not preclude the possibility that a better business environment 
may, besides being more conducive to research and investment in innovation, lead to faster factor 
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In sum, countries that do not put in place an adequate institutional setup, 
one that supports investment in innovation and the adaptation of new technolo-
gies, will not reap the benefits of attaining rapid economic growth even if other 
economic reforms take place, such as trade liberalization or macro stability. Indeed, 
Fernandez-Arias and Montiel (1997) suggest that this is one front where most Latin 
American countries failed during the reform process; not enough emphasis was 
put on building up and strengthening institutions. These authors acknowledge that 
some countries did not even complete the so called first generation reforms; i.e., 
fiscal and macro stability was not attained, as high inflation resumed after a short 
period, and trade liberalization was never completed. In their view, completing 
the macroeconomic reforms that were partially implemented would have bridged 
a significant part of the growth gap observed during 1991-95 between East Asia 
and Latin America. But, in their words, “… we suspect that it [the growth gap] is 
also associated with other deep-seated institutional and structural differences in 
these economies as well. In any event, the gap suggests the need for a broadening 
of the scope of reform in Latin America beyond the macroeconomic sphere if the 
region’s economies are to achieve the standard of performance they seek”.
The next two sections of the paper address the issue raised by Fernandez-
Arias and Montiel (1997). In particular, we try to explain Chile’s better performance 
(described in section 3) on the country’s institutions and continuos reform process. 
Section 5 below discusses in greater detail Chile’s reform process, while section 
6 provides some empirical evidence supporting the view that institutions made a 
difference. We also quantify the contribution of policies and institutions in Chile’s 
growth, paying special attention to the factors underpinning the development of 
the financial sector.
5.  Why is Chile Different?
A common feature in the region is that countries are prone to suffer mac-
roeconomic crises, which usually have fiscal roots and in some cases are even 
exacerbated by financial problems. These macro crises have delayed the reform 
process and in many instances resulted in major setbacks. In contrast, Chile muddled 
through the Tequila, Asian and Russian crises relatively unscathed, partly because 
its fiscal problems were faced early on, culminating with a stringent fiscal respon-
sibility rule, and partly because it counts with a very robust banking sector.
With regards to structural reforms, toward the end of the 1990s most Latin 
American countries had advanced in trade openness, financial liberalization and, 
to a lesser extent, in tax reforms and privatization of SOEs (the so-called “first 
generation reforms”). The main difference in the implementation of these reforms 
was that Chile, followed by Colombia, Argentina and Mexico, began the reform 
process earlier (Morley et al., 1999). But even more important, Chile, unlike the rest 
of the region, continued and deepened the reform process putting more emphasis 
in the institutional buildup. A reform process without an adequate institutional 
setup that supports it, most likely won’t have significant and sustained effects on 
economic growth, and can even result in adverse outcomes. For instance, if financial 72 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
liberalization is not accompanied by an appropriate regulatory and supervisory 
framework –one that protects creditors–, most likely the outcome will be a lend-
ing boom followed by a financial crisis, like it occurred in Chile and other Latin 
American countries in the early 1980s7. Similarly, a privatization program in a 
corrupt environment will most likely have negative effects on growth.
The most recent literature on economic growth has emphasized the role 
of policies and, most importantly, institutions, as the ultimate causes of factor ac-
cumulation and productivity gains. There is growing consensus in the literature 
that countries attain higher economic growth when there is rule of law, property 
rights protection, low bureaucracy, low corruption, adequate supervisory and 
regulatory frameworks that guarantee a fair market competition, stable rules of the 
game, and adequate checks and balances (Rodrik et al., 2002; Easterly and Levine, 
2003). All of these lead to either better economic policies or better outcomes for 
the same policies, and provide a business environment that is more conducive to 
investment, innovation and the hiring of labor.
The role of institutions is clearly illustrated in Figure 4, which shows a scatter 
between per capita GDP (as of 2005) and the quality of the countries’ institutions 
for 168 countries. Two conclusions are worth highlighting: (i) Latin American 
countries tend to be in the bottom part of the figure (they tend to have poor institu-
tions and low GDP per capita); and (ii) Chile is the only Latin American country 
7 On this topic see De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995).
FIGURE 4
QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
(168 countries)
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that appears significantly above the fitted line. In fact, according to Kaufmann et 
al. (2006), as of 2005 Chile appears as the best-ranked emerging market economy 
in terms of the quality of its institutions (average of six categories), followed by 
Uruguay and then Costa Rica among Latin American countries. Chile is even ranked 























1 Finland 1.86 1.49 1.48 2.07 1.74 1.96 2.39
2 Denmark 1.74 1.51 0.91 2.12 1.69 1.99 2.23
3 New Zealand 1.72 1.39 1.20 1.90 1.66 1.95 2.24
4 Switzerland 1.72 1.43 1.26 2.03 1.47 2.02 2.12
6 Sweden 1.66 1.41 1.18 1.93 1.47 1.84 2.10
7 Netherlands 1.60 1.45 0.80 1.95 1.64 1.78 1.99
8 Canada 1.58 1.32 0.91 1.92 1.57 1.81 1.92
9 Australia 1.56 1.32 0.82 1.88 1.58 1.80 1.95
12 Singapore 1.47 –0.29 1.08 2.14 1.79 1.83 2.24
13 Germany 1.42 1.31 0.67 1.51 1.38 1.76 1.92
14 U.K. 1.42 1.30 0.34 1.70 1.53 1.69 1.94
17 United States 1.24 1.19 0.06 1.59 1.47 1.59 1.56
18 Chile 1.18 1.04 0.85 1.26 1.40 1.20 1.34
19 France 1.15 1.28 0.33 1.46 1.09 1.35 1.40
21 Japan 1.13 0.94 0.94 1.16 1.17 1.33 1.24
22 Portugal 1.12 1.32 0.94 1.03 1.20 1.10 1.13
23 Spain 1.10 1.12 0.38 1.40 1.25 1.13 1.34
28 Botswana 0.83 0.68 0.94 0.79 0.76 0.70 1.10
32 Korea. South 0.69 0.74 0.43 1.00 0.77 0.73 0.47
34 Italy 0.61 1.00 0.21 0.60 0.94 0.51 0.41
35 Uruguay 0.60 0.99 0.64 0.53 0.26 0.43 0.78
36 Costa Rica 0.60 0.99 0.76 0.30 0.61 0.54 0.38
41 Malaysia 0.41 –0.41 0.49 1.01 0.50 0.58 0.27
55 Thailand 0.03 0.07 –0.55 0.40 0.38 0.10 –0.24
63 Brazil –0.08 0.36 –0.13 –0.09 0.08 –0.41 –0.28
64 Mexico –0.10 0.29 –0.29 –0.01 0.33 –0.48 –0.41
66 Jamaica –0.11 0.57 –0.33 –0.12 0.24 –0.55 –0.50
71 India –0.2 0.35 –0.85 –0.11 –0.34 0.09 –0.31
72 Argentina –0.29 0.43 –0.26 –0.27 –0.64 –0.56 –0.44
73 Dominican Republic –0.29 0.20 0.05 –0.41 –0.27 –0.66 –0.66
78 Philippines –0.38 0.01 –1.11 –0.07 –0.02 –0.52 –0.58
89 Peru –0.47 0.04 –1.08 –0.60 0.10 –0.77 –0.49
93 Colombia –0.51 –0.32 –1.79 –0.09 0.05 –0.71 –0.22
94 Lebanon –0.53 –0.72 –1.14 –0.30 –0.28 –0.36 –0.39
95 Egypt –0.55 –1.15 –0.90 –0.35 –0.47 0.02 –0.42
97 China –0.57 –1.66 –0.18 –0.11 –0.28 –0.47 –0.69
98 Vietnam –0.57 –1.60 0.34 –0.31 –0.64 –0.45 –0.76
106 Bolivia –0.69 –0.09 –1.15 –0.80 –0.53 –0.78 –0.81
107 Guatemala –0.71 –0.37 –0.89 –0.70 –0.26 –1.04 –0.98
108 Russia –0.71 –0.85 –1.07 –0.45 –0.29 –0.84 –0.74
109 Indonesia –0.71 –0.21 –1.42 –0.47 –0.45 –0.87 –0.86
111 Ecuador –0.75 –0.16 –0.83 –1.01 –0.83 –0.84 –0.81
112 Paraguay –0.76 –0.19 –0.62 –0.83 –0.77 –1.00 –1.19
116 Cameroon –0.89 –1.19 –0.34 –0.90 –0.76 –1.02 –1.15
121 Venezuela –0.99 –0.50 –1.22 –0.83 –1.15 –1.22 –1.00
122 Cuba –0.99 –1.87 0.03 –0.94 –1.75 –1.14 –0.26
147 Haiti –1.49 –1.41 –1.91 –1.39 –1.17 –1.62 –1.45
150 Sudan –1.56 –1.84 –2.05 –1.30 –1.29 –1.48 –1.40
151 Zimbabwe –1.59 –1.65 –1.58 –1.42 –2.20 –1.47 –1.24
153 Iraq –1.77 –1.47 –2.82 –1.64 –1.61 –1.81 –1.27
154 Somalia –2.18 –1.89 –2.51 –2.21 –2.35 –2.36 –1.74
Sources: Kaufmann,  et al. (2006).74 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
And the situation is very similar when looking at each of the index components: 
government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; control of corruption; 
voice and accountability; and political stability. This difference between Chile and 
the other Latin American countries provides a plausible explanation for Chile’s 
better economic performance in the past decades.
Next we discuss the reform process in Chile since the early 1970s. The 
aim is to show that the reforms were deep and wide in scope in Chile. Also, that 
the reform process has not stopped; Chile continues implementing policies in 
many areas. And third, that the institutional setup is not given; it can be modified 
(albeit slowly), so that countries with poor institutions are not condemned by 
their legacy.
5.1  First Stage: The First Generation Reforms
When the economic reform process began, the Chilean economy was in 
complete disarray as the state intervened in virtually every area of production and 
interfered in many economic decisions. Furthermore, fiscal deficits were rampant 
and the economy was isolated from the rest of the world through a complex battery 
of trade restrictions. In a nutshell, by 1973 inflation was running at above 500% 
per year, the fiscal deficit was about 30% of GDP, and the peso was artificially 
overvalued as there were many capital and current-account restrictions aimed at 
containing the external imbalance, including a multiple exchange rate system. In 
addition, the average tariff was about 105%, though effective protection varied 
across economic sectors due to a wide range of restrictions including non–tariff 
barriers, and many prices were set (artificially low) by the government, creating 
a shortage of goods and services in many markets. Further, the state owned about 
600 enterprises, accounting for about 40% of GDP, and financial repression in 
the form of controlled (negative) real interest rates and restrictions on credit al-
location was widespread.
The military government that took power in late 1973 inherited an economy 
in complete chaos. In the early years of the military government exchange rates 
were unified, prices were liberalized for most goods and services, and several 
enterprises, farms and banks that had been intervened and controlled by the state 
were returned to their previous owners. In addition, a major fiscal package compris-
ing drastic cuts in public investment and subsidies, and a freeze in public wages, 
brought the fiscal deficit down to only 5% of GDP in 1974. The fiscal adjustment 
continued, bringing a 4% surplus only two years later (in attaining this surplus it 
helped the economic recovery that followed the initial reforms).
But reforms went far beyond achieving stabilization and correcting mac-
roeconomic imbalances. In 1975, for example, the sales tax was replaced by 
the value-added tax (VAT) at a flat rate of 20%, thus improving the efficiency 
of resource allocation8. Also, non-tariff trade barriers were lifted, while both 
8 Over time, the VAT became the most important source of government revenue, amounting to about 
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the dispersion and the level of tariffs were unilaterally reduced for most goods. 
This process continued into 1979, when a flat tariff of 10% was set for most 
goods9.
Major reforms were also introduced in the financial sector, where interest 
rates were liberalized, banks privatized, mandatory credit allocation abolished, 
entry restrictions lifted, and the scope of permitted activities broadened. But the end 
of financial repression was not preceded or accompanied by an upgrade –or even 
better, an overhaul– of the supervisory and regulatory framework, thus exacerbat-
ing moral hazard and adverse-selection problems10. As a consequence, connected 
lending between banks and enterprises grew unchecked, currency mismatches in 
bank borrower’s balance sheets mounted up and non-performing loans were rolled 
over, while the system operated under a de facto deposit insurance. This made 
the overall financial system prone to crisis and proved to be very costly when the 
economy suffered severe shocks in the early 1980s.
The outcome of all the reforms above combined was a quick economic 
recovery and a sharp reduction in both the fiscal deficit and the inflation rate. 
Indeed, after a sharp recession in 197511, GDP grew on average by about 6.8% 
per year during 1976-81 (7.5% in 1977-81). Similarly, inflation fell sharply reach-
ing the two-digit level just a few years into the stabilization program, although it 
remained around 30% until 1980 (it was slightly below 10% only in 1981). The 
fiscal balance was in surplus through the entire 1976-81 period and the economy 
received large amounts of private capital inflows, mainly in the form of syndicated 
bank debt.
But major macro imbalances arose during this period. In particular, the 
real exchange rate appreciated significantly, the current account deficit climbed 
to 14.5% of GDP in 1981, and the financial sector weakened as major risks and 
vulnerabilities grew unchecked12.
In this scenario of increasing macro-financial fragility, it is easy to under-
stand why the economy plummeted when the external environment deteriorated 
in the early 1980s. The balance of payments crisis and the abandonment of the 
nominal peg that followed were unavoidable after private capital inflows came 
to a halt in 1982. The ensuing real depreciation further aggravated the financial 
crisis because of the large currency mismatches incurred by the private sector13. 
As a result, real GDP fell by about 16.4% (cumulative) during 1982-83.
9 Only a few exceptions remained, like cars and luxury items such as fur and jewelry. 
10   See Barandiarán and Hernández (1999).
11 The recession resulted from the fiscal stabilization program, the first oil shock, and the fall in the 
price of copper in the world market.
12 The risks included unmatched currency liabilities incurred by banks’ debtors, weak asset rating 
systems, under-provisioning, connected lending, and rolling over of bad loans (evergreening of banks’ 
balance sheets).
13 The fiscal cost of the financial crisis is estimated to be close to 40% of GDP. For more details on 
the Chilean banking crisis of the 1980s, see Barandiarán and Hernández (1999).76 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
The economic and financial crises caused a setback on some of the poli-
cies and achievements of previous years. Indeed, the government had to take over 
several financial and non financial institutions, ending up controlling about half 
of the total bank credit14. Additionally it incurred in a fiscal deficit and allowed 
higher inflation rates (in addition to higher tariffs15) to finance it.
It is important to single out two other reforms that were implemented just 
before the debt crisis hit, and which played a major role in the subsequent period: 
the new Constitution of 1980, and the pension system reform of 1981.
The new Constitution of 1980 is important not only because it set the 
timetable for the return to a democratic regime in Chile, but also because it 
granted the power to allocate government spending exclusively to the execu-
tive branch, thus closely linking expenditures with revenues16. Thus, today the 
Chilean Congress can either pass or reject the coming year´s budget law sub-
mitted to it by the government, but cannot amend such law. This has proven to 
be an important factor for maintaining fiscal discipline. In addition, the new 
Constitution prohibited the Central Bank from buying securities issued by the 
government, thus precluding the monetization of the deficit. The Central Bank 
was also given the explicit mandate to pursue the stability of prices (or of the 
currency), the stability of external payments, and the stability of the domestic 
payment system. Finally, it was granted full independence from the executive 
branch by the way its authorities would be designated17. (It should be mentioned 
that although legislated earlier, these changes came into effect de facto in 1989, 
with the country’s return to democracy).
The pension system reform of 1981 consisted of the phasing out of the 
bankrupt pay-as-you-go system and the creation of a fully funded capitalization 
system run by private, competing entities. In the new system workers make man-
datory monthly contributions into personal savings accounts, which are managed 
by specialized private entities, and whose balances cannot be withdrawn before 
retirement. This reform led to an increase in total savings and, at the same time, 
contributed to the development and deepening of the domestic capital markets, 
thus indirectly helping to raise total factor productivity –we explore this effect in 
greater detail below18.
14 The intervened institutions were later on privatized, merged or shut down.
15 Import tariffs were temporarily raised to help the fiscal adjustment.
16 Prior to this legal change, the legislative branch shared the power to allocate public money, but was 
not required to provide the necessary funding, thus exacerbating the bias toward having a large fiscal 
deficit purely for political reasons.
17 Pursuant to the law, the Central Bank is run by a Board composed of five members, each one ap-
pointed for a ten year term; every two years a new member is appointed. Board members are nominated 
by the government, but need senate approval. The Governor is then chosen among the five board 
members by the country’s President for a period of five years, or the time remaining in the member’s 
term, whatever is shorter. The Deputy Governor is chosen by vote among the other members of the 
Central Bank Board.
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5.2  Second Stage: The Deepening and Institutionalization of Reforms
In the aftermath of the debt crisis, the government focused its policies on 
two areas: redoing some of the work of previous years –privatizing banks and 
enterprises taken over during the crisis, continue reducing the budget deficit and 
inflation– and overhauling the institutional framework to correct the problems and 
regulatory shortcomings that had been diagnosed during (and were partly respon-
sible for) the crisis19. Thus, a new tax law was enacted in 1984, which provided 
special incentives for saving and investment. For instance, profits became non–
taxable if reinvested (taxes accrued only when profits were distributed in the form 
of dividends) and the corporate tax rate was reduced.20 Also, new banking and 
bankruptcy laws were enacted in 1986. The new banking law granted more powers 
to the supervisory and regulatory agencies, while updating specific regulations to 
keep up with international standards and best practices. The new bankruptcy law 
set for very clear steps for the liquidation and closure of banks and seniorities for 
the payment of debts to creditors.
Other important institutional changes included the setting of a framework 
for controlling and monitoring monopolistic practices, and the privatization of 
SOEs, comprising not only banks and other firms taken over during the debt crisis, 
but also utilities formerly owned and operated by the state, such as electricity 
generation and distribution, long–distance and local telephone companies21. The 
new wave of privatization brought the share of SOEs in GDP down from 24% in 
1983, to 13% in 1989.
In 1989, a new Central Bank law was enacted, whereby the Central Bank’s 
sole objectives are the stability of prices, the stability of the domestic payment 
system, and the stability of Chile’s external payments. This new charter led the 
Central Bank, now autonomous, to adopt in 1991 a monetary policy scheme based 
on inflation targeting and a widening exchange rate band. The exchange rate band 
was abolished later on (in 1999), leading to a free-float in which the Central Bank 
19 It should be stressed that the decision to maintain the outward oriented market-economy model 
in the aftermath of the debt crisis was crucial to determine the country’s economic performance in 
subsequent years. Indeed, after that almost a decade of economic reforms had ended in a recession 
and deep financial crisis, the development model was discredited. In this setting it could have been 
easily replaced by the inward looking model with greater government intervention, thus reversing the 
progress achieved during the past decade. Fortunately, the authorities at the time decided to maintain 
the same overall development strategy, focussing instead on correcting its institutional and regulatory 
shortcomings.
20 At the same time, double taxation on dividends was abolished by giving shareholders a tax credit, 
to be used in their personal income tax, equal to the proportional corporate tax paid by the company. 
This way the tax-induced bias in favor of corporate borrowing to finance investment was eliminated 
(Modigliani-Miller’s modified proposition, 1963). In addition, special tax incentives were provided 
for the issuance of equity. Buyers of new shares, IPOs, received a tax credit, equal to a fraction of their 
investment, which would last for as long as they held on to the new shares. For details see Hernández 
and Walker (1993).
21 For details see Larrain and Vergara (2001).78 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
intervenes only when the exchange rate market becomes dysfunctional and the 
exchange rate is clearly misaligned from its fundamentals. As a result of all these 
changes, the inflation rate in Chile today has converged to the Central Bank’s 
steady-state target, a range of 2 to 4 percent per year, a level that nobody thought 
feasible just a decade earlier22.
Also, new legislation allowing the participation of the private sector in 
infrastructure development was passed in 1991. According to it, roads, highways, 
airports, seaports and other infrastructure projects may be developed by the private 
sector under build, operate and transfer (BOT) arrangements. And in 1994, a new 
law was passed permitting free entry to the –until then monopolistic– long-distance 
telecommunications market, the so-called “multi-carrier” system.
It is important to mention that during this period the country successfully 
transited from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. Despite all the uncertain-
ties surrounding this transition, the change was smooth, in part because the new 
Administration confirmed most of the market economy elements already in place, 
while concentrating on a social agenda. This way the economic institutions cre-
ated in previous years were validated and in many cases strengthened, so that 
uncertainty vanished. For instance, early on in 1990 the new democratic govern-
ment deepened the opening up process by reducing the maximum import tariff 
from 15% to 11%. In fact, all four governments that have been in power since 
1990 have strengthened the market economy model, accelerated the opening up 
process, consolidated the fiscal position and improved regulations, while, at the 
same time, they have emphasized social policies and implemented new programs 
to alleviate poverty.
But the reform process has continued up to now with the introduction of 
policies and institutional changes aimed at further consolidating the market-oriented 
economic model and improving the Chilean economy’s resilience to shocks. 
Thus, amendments to the banking law in 1997 allowed banks to undertake new 
businesses, including lending internationally, while upgrading some regulations, 
i.e., the Basel capital accord was adopted. In 1998 a law was passed unilaterally 
reducing the import tariff by one percentage point every year, stopping at 6% in 
January 2003. Furthermore, in 2002 Chile signed a free trade agreement with the 
European Union, in 2003 with the United States, in 2004 with South Korea, and 
in 2005 with China, thus consolidating the process of integration with the world 
economy. Also, in 2001 the government committed to achieving and maintaining 
a 1% structural fiscal surplus. Under this commitment, government expenditures 
are set every year to be 1% of GDP less than the Government’s structural revenues, 
which are defined as the revenues that would occur in steady state23. This rule 
22 Thus, an inflation that started to develop in 1860 was finally controlled by the late 1990s.
23 In other words, expenditures are one percentage point of GDP less than the revenues that would 
occur if the economy were on its long-term path (after eliminating cyclical variations in taxes and other 
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is intended to guarantee that the government will remain solvent in the long run. 
Also in 2001, all remaining capital controls were abolished, ending more than 
half a century of a partly closed capital account. And during this period regulatory 
and tax changes were introduced, aimed at increasing the efficiency and foster-
ing the development of capital markets by providing incentives to save. Also, 
during this period the exchange rate band was abandoned, consolidating both the 
inflation targeting and the free float regimes, while a voluntary unemployment 
insurance scheme was introduced. Finally, in 2003 three new laws were passed 
that (i) established a clearer career path for public servants, based on merits, 
thereby significantly reducing the scope for the government to appoint political 
allies in senior positions; (ii) provided public funding for political parties; and 
(iii) regulated private donations to political parties and candidates. These three 
laws should increase transparency, reduce the scope for corruption, and allow the 
public sector to attract more qualified people.
In sum, Chile not only began its economic reform process a decade earlier 
than the rest of Latin America; it also completed and deepened many of the re-
forms in subsequent years. Further, it changed the institutional setup to enhance 
the credibility –and effectiveness– of its policies and the country’s resilience to 
shocks. Without the continuos progress in all these areas, most likely the pay-off 
in terms of growth would have been less than it was and the economy would have 
remained highly vulnerable to crises.
6.  Deepening the Reforms: What is at Stake?
The previous section has shown how Chile introduced and deepened the 
reforms, putting special emphasis on the institutional buildup. In the process, the 
country has established high credibility and its institutions have won reputation, 
being today of better quality than in all other countries in the region.
Based on Chile’s experience an interesting question arises: What benefits 
would accrue to countries that intensify their reform process to attain Chile’s 
–or higher– standards in terms of macroeconomic indicators, policies and, most 
important, institutions?
6.1  Explaining Economic Growth and Volatility
Model Specification and Definition of Variables
To answer the question above we estimate a cross section of about 80 
countries, whose empirical form is based on a theoretical model of conditional 
convergence as developed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). Besides following 
the standard procedure of the empirical growth literature, in which the long term 
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well known Barro-regressions), we also want to test the importance of institutions. 
Therefore we run two sets of regressions. In the first set the dependent variable 
is the average growth of per-capita GDP during 1960-2005. In the second, the 
dependent variable is the volatility (measured by the standard deviation) of the 
per-capita GDP growth rate over the same time period. The second set of regres-
sions is motivated by recent research by Acemoglu et al. (2003) that suggests 
that volatility is not caused only by bad policies –exchange rate overvaluation, 
inflation, government consumption, or other– but also by poor quality institutions. 
Poor quality institutions may cause volatility directly and indirectly by leading to 
bad economic policies. The two regressions are of the following form:
(1)   YX ii ii QI =+ ++ αα αε 01 2
(2)  σβ ββ µ  Y ii i i
X =+ ++ 01 2 QI
where Y is per capita GDP, QI is an index measuring the quality of institutions in 
each country, X is a set of other explanatory variables, a dot over a variable means 
its change over time and ε and µ are random terms.
Following the standard literature, the set of explanatory variables X includes 
initial conditions, policy variables, and one endowment/geography variable. Among 
the initial conditions we include the log of per-capita GDP in 1960, and the average 
years of schooling in 1960. Policy variables include openness (measured as exports 
plus imports over GDP24), government consumption (in percentage of GDP), the 
real exchange rate overvaluation, and financial development measured as the ratio 
of private credit to GDP. In the robustness exercises (Appendix, Table A.2) we 
also include the exchange rate black-market premium, and the growth of the terms 
of trade. In equation (2) we also include inflation and its volatility, the volatility 
of government consumption and the volatility of term of trade (see robustness 
check in Table A.3). All the policy variables are measured as the average for the 
1960-2005 period. For completeness, in the robustness exercises in Table A.2 we 
also include two endowment/geography variables; either a dummy indicating 
whether the country has access to the seacoast, or the proportion of land area 
within 100 km of the seacoast25.
24 For robustness checking, in a few regressions we use the alternative suggested by Calderón, Loayza 
and Servén (2003), but the results do not change. This alternative variable is labeled openness 2 in the 
Appendix, Table A.2 and A.3.
25 The precise definition and source for each variable is provided in table A.1 in the appendix.Economic Reforms, Financial Development and Growth 81
Our institution quality variable, QI, is obtained from the Governance Indicators 
dataset developed by Kaufmann et al. (2006), which is available biannually for 
the period 1996-2005 (annually for 2004-05), the most complete dataset of this 
kind available26. For the estimation of equations (1) and (2) we take the average 
over 1996-2005 of the following six indices for each country27:
TABLE 5
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INDEX COMPOSITION
Index Definition
Voice and accountability Extent to which citizens can choose their government, political 
rights, civil liberties, and an independent press.
Political instability and violence Likelihood that the government will be overthrown by unconsti-
tutional or violent means.
Government effectiveness Quality of public service delivery, competence of civil servants, 
and the degree of politicization of civil service.
Regulatory burden Government control on goods markets, government interference in 
the banking system, excessive bureaucracy to start a new business, 
and excessive regulation of private businesses and international 
trade.
Rule of law Protection of individuals and property against violence or theft, 
independent and effective judges, and contract enforcement.
Graft or control of corruption Use of public power for private gain and degree of corruption.
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2006).
Econometric Problems
The estimation of equations (1) and (2) poses a problem, namely the poten-
tial endogeneity of some of the right-hand-side variables; in particular, openness, 
financial development and the quality of institutions. To address this problem we 
use two-stage least squares and the standard instruments suggested in the literature. 
The instrument for openness is the fitted value that results from a gravity equa-
tion as suggested by Frankel and Romer (1999). For the quality of institutions we 
26 For a complete description of the methodology used for constructing these institutional indicators 
see Kaufmann et al. (2006).
27 Other papers use Rule of Law as an indicator of the quality of institutions. Although we use a 
broader index, the results reported below are robust to the use of Rule of Law. Besides, the correlation 
between our broader index and the latter is 0.97.82 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
use a set of alternative instruments, namely the distance of the capital city from 
the Equator line, the etno-linguistic fraction of the population, the fraction of the 
population speaking English, the fraction of the population speaking one of the 
major languages of Western Europe, and the origin of the legal system28. In the 
case of financial development, we take stock of the mounting evidence provided in 
recent years proving that “financial development causes growth” and treat it as an 
exogenous variable. (Just for completeness we instrument this variable using the 
origin of the legal system, as suggested by La Porta et al. (1999), but the results 
change only marginally.)
Before proceeding a methodological note is in order. The dependent variables 
in equations 1 and 2 are the average and the volatility of the per-capita GDP growth 
rate for 1960-2005, respectively, while in both regressions the variable indicating 
the quality of each country’s institutions, QI, is measured over 1996-2005. The 
difference in the QI variable between what we would like to measure (the entire 
period 1960-2005) and what we can measure (it’s only available for the period 
1996-2005), posses a measurement problem that could invalidate our results. Our 
results would still be valid, however, if we assume that Chile had, on average, 
better institutions than the rest of Latin America over the entire 1960-2005 period, 
similar to the relationship that we observe in the period 1996-2005. This assump-
tion is consistent with an institutional path in which (i) the starting point in the 
reform process across the LAC countries was similar until the mid seventies, when 
macro and micro problems were common among Latin American economies, and 
(ii) a faster institutional change occured in the Chilean economy thereafter, which 
is plausible considering that Chile started the reform procces a decade earlier 
and advanced faster. Additionally, although it is debatable, there is not a priori a 
reason to believe that Chile’s institutions in the early 60s were worse than those 
in other LAC countries29.
Due to the problem above, to check for the robustness of our findings we 
re-estimate both cross-sectional regressions for the shorter sample period, 1996- 
2005, although doing so leads to poorer results due to the greater importance 
of cyclical factors. The results show, as expected, that some of the explanatory 
variables lose statistical significance, in particular financial development and the 
overvaluation of the real exchange rate, while initial conditions appear less robust. 
However, the quality of institutions variable turns out to be statistically significant, 
with the correct sign and with an even larger coefficient than in the regression with 
the long data set, which shows that our results are robust to changing (reducing) 
the sample period30. This finding makes us believe that the results reported below 
are robust and that the coefficient α1 can be interpreted as the minimum effect of 
institutions on long run economic growth.
28 Another instrument proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2002) is the mortality rate of settlers. We do not 
use it because doing so would reduce our sample size significantly.
29 Although there is not empirical evidence in this regard, compared with other LAC countries Chile 
has always been perceived as a country with low corruption and good rule of law.
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Results
The main results of estimating equations (1) and (2) are reported in Tables 6 
and 7, respectively (all the regressions where we test for robustness are reported 
in Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix)31, 32.
The first two regressions (columns) in Table 6 are simple OLS, before and 
after controlling for the quality of institutions. The main conclusion that emerges 
from comparing the first two columns is that institutions matter, that is, not only 
the α1 coefficient turns out to be significant, but excluding the institutions vari-
able biases upwards (in absolute value) all the other coefficients, except for initial 
GDP. Note also that the results from columns 1 and 2 are consistent with previous 
findings: there is convergence in per-capita GDP (poorer countries tend to grow 
faster), education and financial development affect growth positively, while keeping 
an overvalued exchange rate is detrimental to growth. Openness and government 
consumption, although having the right sign, do not attain statistical significance 
at the standard levels33.
As argued, some of the right–hand side variables may be endogenous and 
that may be causing a bias in the results. Columns 3 through 7 address this problem 
by using instruments. In the regression in column 3 we use instruments only for the 
institutions variable, in the one in column 4 we use instruments for institutions and 
openness but not for financial development, and in column 5 we use instruments 
for financial development and institutions, but not for openness. The regression 
in column 6 excludes the institutions variable and uses instruments for financial 
31 Table A.2 shows robustness exercises for the economic growth equation. In this table, columns 
8 through 13 include other controls such as terms of trade growth, black market premium, and two 
endowment/geographic variables (a dummy indicating whether the country has access to the seacoast, 
and the proportion of land area within 100 km of the seacoast). In columns 14 through to 16 we use 
instruments for openness and financial development (and try different control variables). In columns 
17 and 18 we use a different definition for openness. Finally, in columns 19 through 20 we try different 
combinations of instruments. Table A.3 shows robustness exercises for the growth volatility equation. 
In this table, in columns 8 through 11 we prove different controls such as inflation and its volatility, and 
government consumption volatility, while equation 12 includes only significant variables. In columns 
13 through to 16 we use also instruments for openness and financial development (and try different 
control variables). In columns 17 and 18 we use a different definition for openness. Finally, in columns 
19 through 20 we try different combinations of instruments. In a previous version of this paper we 
present more robust test equations and results do not change (see Hernández y Parro, 2005).
32 It should be mentioned that, as we follow the standard literature, our results are subject to the same 
caveats and shortcomings of all recent papers on institutions and growth, in particular with respect 
to the choice and validity of the instruments and the estimation procedure (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 
2003; Beck et al., 2003a, 2003b; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999). For a test on the validity of the 
instruments see Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al. (2002).
33 Empirical results indicate that the effect of openness on GDP growth is ambiguous. In particular, 
cross-section studies tend to find no such effect or the effect, when shown, is not robust, while a posi-
tive and robust effect emerges in panel data studies that capture the temporal effect of openness. See 
Calderón et al. (2004) for a complete review of the empirical literature about the effect of openness 
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development and openness, and the regression in column 7 includes institutions 
and uses instruments for all the potentially endogenous variables.
The conclusions that emerge from columns 3 through 7 are very similar 
to those from columns 1 and 2, that is, institutions matter (excluding this vari-
able biases all other coefficients), there is per-capita GDP convergence, the level 
of education matters, and among the policy variables the most important are 
exchange rate overvaluation and financial development. In addition, when using 
an instrument for financial development, the corresponding coefficient turns out 
larger but is estimated less precisely (its marginal significance level is about 13% 
in columns 5 and 7).
TABLE 6
ECONOMIC GROWTH DETERMINANTES
Dependent variable: growth of per capita GDP at PPP prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

































































































Constructed trade share  No No No Yes No Yes Yes
Legal origin No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Etnolinguistic fraction No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
F. P. S. E.(1) No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
F. P. S. W. E.(2)  No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Distance(3)  No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.59 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.58 0.68
Number of observations 77 75 75 75 75 76 75
Notes: t tests are in brackets. *, **, *** Significant at 1% , 5% and 10% respectively.
(1) Fraction of the population speaking English. (2) Fraction of the population speaking one of the 
major languages of Western Europe. (3) Distance from Equator of capital city.Economic Reforms, Financial Development and Growth 85
Three other conclusions are worth noting from Table 6 (and confirmed 
by the robustness tests in Table A.2). First, the coefficient that accompanies the 
institution variable, α1, is robust to many alternative specifications and very stable 
(at around 0.0095). Second, the coefficients for the education and exchange rate 
overvaluation variables are not biased (or are only marginally so) when the insti-
tutions variable is excluded. And third, financial development matters for growth 
on its own, even after controlling for the quality of institutions.
Using the results from Tables 6 and A.2 (using the average coefficient ± 
one std. deviation), it is possible to estimate the potential effect for the average 
Latin American country of adopting Chile’s institutions, or even better, the institu-
tions of developed countries or Finland’s, the top one among all the countries in 
the sample. The results, reported in Table 8, indicate that by having institutions 
of quality similar to Chile’s, the average Latin American country could raise its 
per-capita GDP growth rate between 0.9% and 2.0% per year (or by about 1.5% 
per year, on average). Or better still, by having Finland’s institutions the increase 
would be between 1.3% and 2.9% per year (or by about 2.1% per year, on aver-
age). Note that in this case Chile’s per-capita GDP growth would raise only by 
about 0.6% per year on average, because the difference between Chile’s and 
advanced economies’ institutions is marginal. Compared with historical growth 
rates of per capita GDP in Latin America (1.2% p.a. during 1960-2005, using a 
simple average, and 1.7% p.a. taking a GDP–weighted average), the potential 
raise is quite significant. It means that, on average, per capita GDP would double 
in about 20-2534 years instead of 60 (these numbers change to 22-1835 and 38, 
respectively, if using the GDP-weighted average).
The results above also provide an explanation for Latin America’s poorer 
performance during the 1990s vis-à-vis Chile or East Asia (this is reported in 
Table 8). In the former case, about half of the predicted growth difference can 
be explained by better institutions and about half by better policies (differences 
in initial conditions matter but less than differences in policies and institutions). 
Among policy variables, financial development is by far the most important, sug-
gesting that countries should pay special attention to promote the development of 
the financial sector. In the latter case, policies played a much greater role, specially 
financial development, mainly because there is not much difference in the qual-
ity of institutions between the average Latin American country and the average 
East Asian country. Although smaller in magnitude, the sustained overvaluation 
of the real exchange rate also added to the poor performance of the average Latin 
American country.
With regards to GDP growth volatility, the results reported in Table 7 suggest 
that the quality of institutions matter –better institutions reduce volatility– and, 
therefore, excluding this variable biases all the coefficients, especially the one 
34 20 if compared to Finland’s institutions and 25 if compared to Chile’s
35 18 if compared to Finland’s institutions and 22 if compared to Chile’s.86 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
on financial development (note that Tables 6 and 7 are similar in structure)36. In 
addition, using instruments (2SLS) changes the parameters of some variables (β1 
appears to be less stable than α1 as reported in Table 6). Most important, the only 
variable besides institutions that matter is the overvaluation of the exchange rate 
(keeping an overvalued exchange rate raises GDP growth volatility).
TABLE 7
GROWTH VOLATILITY ESTIMATES
Dependent variable: Standard deviation of per capita GDP growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






































































Constructed trade share No No No Yes No Yes Yes
Legal origin No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Etnolinguistic fraction No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
F. P. S. E.(1) No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
F. P. S. W. E.(2) No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Distance(3) No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.43 0.47 0.35
Number of observations 76 74 74 74 74 75 74
Notes: t tests are in brackets. *, **, *** Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
(1) Fraction of the population speaking English. (2) Fraction of the population speaking one of the 
major languages of Western Europe. (3) Distance from Equator of capital city.
36 That is, regressions in columns 1 and 2 are OLS estimations with and without the institutions variable; 
regressions in columns 3 through 5 use instruments for some of the potentially endogenous variables 
(in the same order explained in the text); and columns 6 and 7 use instruments for all the endogenous 
variables, openness, financial development and quality of institutions (column 7).Economic Reforms, Financial Development and Growth 87
TABLE 8
EFFECTS ON PER-CAPITA GDP GROWTH RATES OF HAVING


























Chile 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.9
Argentina 0.9 1.4 1.9 0.9 1.4 2.0 1.3 2.0 2.8
Bolivia 1.1 1.8 2.5 1.1 1.8 2.5 1.5 2.4 3.3
Brazil 0.7 1.2 1.7 0.8 1.2 1.7 1.1 1.8 2.5
Colombia 1.0 1.6 2.2 1.0 1.6 2.3 1.4 2.3 3.1
Costa Rica 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.7 1.2 1.7
Dominican Republic 0.9 1.4 1.9 0.9 1.4 2.0 1.3 2.0 2.8
Ecuador 1.1 1.8 2.5 1.2 1.9 2.6 1.5 2.5 3.4
El Salvador 0.8 1.3 1.7 0.8 1.3 1.8 1.2 1.9 2.6
Guatemala 1.1 1.8 2.5 1.1 1.8 2.5 1.5 2.4 3.4
Haiti 1.6 2.5 3.5 1.6 2.6 3.6 2.0 3.2 4.4
Honduras 1.0 1.7 2.3 1.1 1.7 2.4 1.4 2.3 3.2
Jamaica 0.8 1.2 1.7 0.8 1.3 1.8 1.2 1.9 2.6
Mexico 0.8 1.2 1.7 0.8 1.3 1.7 1.2 1.9 2.6
Nicaragua 0.9 1.5 2.1 1.0 1.6 2.2 1.3 2.2 3.0
Paraguay 1.1 1.8 2.6 1.2 1.9 2.6 1.5 2.5 3.4
Peru 1.0 1.6 2.2 1.0 1.6 2.2 1.4 2.2 3.0
Trinidad y Tobago 0.6 0.9 1.3 0.6 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.6 2.2
Uruguay 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.7 1.2 1.6
Venezuela 1.3 2.1 2.8 1.3 2.1 2.9 1.7 2.7 3.7
Simple average excluding Chile 0.9 1.5 2.0 0.9 1.5 2.1 1.3 2.1 2.9
Simple average including Chile 0.9 1.4 1.9 0.9 1.4 2.0 1.3 2.0 2.8
Weighted average excluding Chile 0.8 1.3 1.8 0.8 1.4 1.9 1.2 2.0 2.7
Weighted average including Chile 0.8 1.3 1.7 0.8 1.3 1.8 1.2 1.9 2.6
Notes: (1) Weighted averages are constructed using each country’s GDP as weights. (2) Min and Max 
are calculated using the average coefficient plus/minus one standard deviation.
Source: Own elaboration.
Finally, Table 10 reports the (again, simulated) effect on the volatility of 
per-capita GPD growth for the average Latin American country, of it adopting 
institutions of similar quality to Chile’s, or even better, Finland’s. The reduc-
tion is significant: volatility would fall on average by about 40% per year (from 
4.2% to 2.5%) in the former case, and by about 57% (from 4.2% to 1.8%) in the 
latter (numbers are very similar if using simple or weighted average historical 
data).88 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
TABLE 9
DIFFERENCE IN GROWTH PERFORMANCE:
CHILE VS. LATIN AMERICA AND EAST ASIA VS. LATIN AMERICA
(1990-2000)
Chile vs. Latin America
(1990-2000)














Inicial GDP –0.4% 0.3% –0.3% 0.1%
Human Capital 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Quality of Institutions 1.1% 1.1% 0.4% 0.3%
Financial Development 0.7% 0.7% 0.9% 1.0%
Exchange Rate Overvaluation 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1%
Predicted Difference 2.0% 2.5% 1.5% 1.7%
Actual Difference 3.3% 3.2% 2.1% 2.5%
* East Asia countries include Singapore, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand.
Note: Weighted averages are constructed using each country’s GDP as weights.
Source: Own elaboration.
TABLE 10
EFFECTS ON THE VOLATILITY OF PER-CAPITA GDP OF HAVING INSTITUTIONS 

























Chile 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.1 –0.4 –0.7 –1.1
Argentina –0.9 –1.6 –2.3 –0.9 –1.7 –2.4 –1.3 –2.4 –3.4
Bolivia –1.2 –2.1 –3.0 –1.2 –2.1 –3.0 –1.6 –2.8 –4.0
Brazil –0.8 –1.4 –2.0 –0.8 –1.4 –2.1 –1.2 –2.1 –3.1
Colombia –1.1 –1.9 –2.7 –1.1 –1.9 –2.7 –1.5 –2.6 –3.7
Costa Rica –0.4 –0.6 –0.9 –0.4 –0.7 –1.0 –0.8 –1.4 –2.0
Dominican Republic –0.9 –1.6 –2.3 –0.9 –1.7 –2.4 –1.3 –2.4 –3.4
Ecuador –1.2 –2.1 –3.0 –1.2 –2.2 –3.1 –1.6 –2.9 –4.1
El Salvador –0.8 –1.5 –2.1 –0.8 –1.5 –2.1 –1.2 –2.2 –3.2
Guatemala –1.2 –2.1 –3.0 –1.2 –2.1 –3.0 –1.6 –2.8 –4.0
Haití –1.7 –2.9 –4.2 –1.7 –3.0 –4.3 –2.1 –3.7 –5.3
Honduras –1.1 –1.9 –2.8 –1.1 –2.0 –2.8 –1.5 –2.7 –3.8
Jamaica –0.8 –1.4 –2.0 –0.8 –1.5 –2.1 –1.2 –2.2 –3.1
Mexico –0.8 –1.4 –2.0 –0.8 –1.5 –2.1 –1.2 –2.1 –3.1
Nicaragua –1.0 –1.8 –2.5 –1.0 –1.8 –2.6 –1.4 –2.5 –3.6
Paraguay –1.2 –2.1 –3.1 –1.2 –2.2 –3.1 –1.6 –2.9 –4.1
Peru –1.0 –1.8 –2.6 –1.0 –1.9 –2.7 –1.4 –2.6 –3.7
Trinidad y Tobago –0.6 –1.1 –1.5 –0.6 –1.1 –1.6 –1.0 –1.8 –2.6
Uruguay –0.4 –0.6 –0.9 –0.4 –0.7 –1.0 –0.8 –1.4 –2.0
Venezuela –1.3 –2.4 –3.4 –1.4 –2.4 –3.5 –1.8 –3.1 –4.5
Simple average excluding Chile –1.0 –1.7 –2.4 –1.0 –1.7 –2.5 –1.4 –2.4 –3.5
Simple average including Chile –0.9 –1.6 –2.3 –0.9 –1.7 –2.4 –1.3 –2.4 –3.4
Weighted average excluding Chile –0.9 –1.5 –2.2 –0.9 –1.6 –2.3 –1.3 –2.3 –3.3
Weighted average including Chile –0.8 –1.5 –2.1 –0.8 –1.5 –2.2 –1.2 –2.2 –3.2
Notes: (1) Weighted averages are constructed using each country’s GDP as weights. (2) Min and Max 
are calculated using the average coefficient plus/minus one standard deviation.
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6.2  Explaining Financial Development
The cross-sectional evidence from the previous subsection supports the 
view that both the quality of institutions and the degree of financial development 
matter for growth. Further, when compared with the other explanatory variables 
–initial conditions and the real exchange rate overvaluation– it turns out that these 
two variables explain most of the difference in economic growth performance 
between Chile and the rest of Latin America and between East Asia and Latin 
America during the 1990s (Table 9).
At this point it is therefore important to understand why the Chilean fi-
nancial system is the largest in Latin America and one of the larger ones among 
emerging market economies (Figure 5). This subsection sheds some light on this 
issue and tries to identify the ultimate sources of the financial development in 
Chile during the past forty years.
FIGURE 5
FINANCIAL ASSETS
(2005, % GDP, selected countries)
Note: The assets of the financial system include liquid liabilities of banks and non-bank financial 
institutions, stock market capitalization, and domestic private and public bonds.
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The literature that looks into the factors that explain financial develop-
ment, which is mainly based on cross-sectional studies, has identified two sets of 
explanatory variables, namely ‘policy-related’ determinants (i.e., legal, regulatory 
and macroeconomic policies) and ‘deeper’ determinants (i.e., political, cultural, 
and even geographical factors). Regarding the first set of variables, La Porta et al. 
(1997, 1998) show the importance of property rights protection in fostering financial 
development. Similarly, Beck et al. (2003a) conclude that the adaptability of the 
legal system is crucial, while Barth et al. (2003) show that adequate bank regula-
tion and supervision –i.e., providing incentives for greater information disclosure 
without granting regulators excessive powers– is important for the development 
of the banking sector. With respect to macro policies, Boyd et al. (2000) and 
Khan et al. (2002) find significant non-linear negative effects of inflation on the 
development of banks and the stock market. Similarly, Bencivenga and Smith 
(1992), Huybens and Smith (1999), and Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) show 
how monetary and fiscal policies affect the taxation of financial intermediaries 
and, therefore, the provision of financial services.
With regards to deeper determinants, La Porta et al. (1998) emphasize the 
importance of the origin of the legal system, while Stulz and Williamson (2003) 
highlight the role of religion. Finally, Beck et al. (2003b), Easterly and Levine 
(2003), and Acemoglu et al. (2001) show the importance of geography in the shap-
ing of institutions that, in turn, affect the development of the financial system.
In this subsection of the paper we follow the first approach and use time–
series analysis to explain financial development in Chile. This approach has the 
advantage of allowing us to capture the contribution of key economic reforms 
undertaken in recent decades. For this purpose we use a modified version of the 
empirical model developed by Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003), where the 
dependent variable measures the size of the Chilean financial market as a share 
of GDP. This measure, which adds up the most important financial instruments 
of the Chilean capital markets, is consistent with financial development measures 
frequently used in the literature. The constructed variable consists of liquid liabilities 
of the financial system (banks and other non-bank financial intermediaries), stock 
market capitalization, domestic private and public bonds, and mortgage related 
bonds37. The evolution of this variable is showed in Figure 6.
The estimation seeks a co-integration relationship between the financial 
development variable and a set of explanatory variables comprising the size of 
the (mandatory) pension industry, an index measuring the progress in structural 
reform processes, and a few variables to capture other important macro-financial 
policies and reforms. Among the latter are two dummy variables to capture the 
reduction in inflation and a variable that measures real exchange rate misalignment 
(the rationale for including this variable is to control for cyclical fluctuations and 
for potential financial sector distress due to balance sheet effects). In addition, 
37 Following Beck et al. (2000), beginning- and end-of the year financial variables were CPI-deflated 
and then averaged. This average was then divided by GDP (deflated by the year-average CPI).Economic Reforms, Financial Development and Growth 91
we incorporate a variable that was not included in Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel’s 
model and that captures the 1986 reform to the banking sector.
FIGURE 6
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHILE
(1961-2005, percentage)
Note: Financial Development is defined as the sum of liquid liabilities of the financial system, stock 
market capitalization, domestic private and public bonds, and mortgage-related bonds, as a share of 
GDP.
Source: Own elaboration based on the procedure proposed in Bennett, Schmidt-Hebbel and Soto 
(1999).
The pension industry variable (PR) is equal to the annual mandatory savings 
flow of the new private system created by the pension reform of 1981. The struc-
tural reform index (SR) is an average of the progress achieved in trade openness, 
financial liberalization, tax reforms and privatization of state-owned enterprises. 
The inflation-related dummies identify thresholds; Dπ<10 equals one whenever 
inflation is below 10%, while the second (Dπ<20) equals one whenever inflation in 
the current and adjacent years is below 20%38, 39. Finally, the banking sector reform 
variable is a trend starting in 1986 with diminishing returns over time (it takes the 
form tα, where α takes the values of 1, 0.75 or 0.5). The estimation is done for the 
period 1961-2005. Our final specification adopts the following form:
38 Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel try different functional forms and thresholds for inflation. The dummies 
defined as explained in the text are their preferred specification.
39 This functional form explicitly acknowledges the presence of non-linear effects of inflation on 
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where FD is the financial development, defined as the sum of liquid liabilities of 
the financial system (banks and non-bank financial intermediaries), stock market 
capitalization, domestic private and public bonds, and mortgage-related bonds, 
each as a share of GDP,  Dπ<10 and Dπ<20 are the inflation-related dummies, RERG 
is the real exchange rate misalignment –defined as the difference between the real 
exchange rate and its long-term value computed using a Hodrick-Prescott filter– 
and DBR86 is the trend variable that captures the effect of the 1986 banking sector 
reform. Finally, ϖt is a random term.
The results from estimating equation (3) are shown in Table 11. As expected, 
all variables came out significant at traditional confidence levels (except Dπ<10 in 
two equations40) and with the expected signs. Further, all equations co-integrate at 
the 1% significance level. Thus, we can conclude that all the explanatory variables 
(i.e., the 1981 pension reform, the structural reforms, the 1986 banking reform 
and the reduction in inflation) had a significant effect on fostering the develop-
ment of capital markets.
TABLE 11
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT ESTIMATES I
Dependent Variable: Financial development
(1) (2) (3)
RERG –0.383* –0.380* –0.366*
(–3.13) (–3.13) (–2.98)
PR 8.485* 9.316* 10.152*
(7.91) (10.15) (11.72)
SR 0.549* 0.541* 0.536*
(5.52) (5.45) (5.29)
Dπ<10 7.580*** 6.290 6.235
(1.74) (1.41) (1.36)








Adjusted R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99
Co-integration test Yes Yes Yes
Note: t  tests are in brackets. *, *** Significant at 1% and 10% level respectively. Yes: Co-integrates 
at 1% significance level according to Mackinnon’s critical values.
40 This result and the statistical significance of the Dπ<20 dummy are consistent with the existence of 
non–linear effects of inflation on financial development (see footnote 39).Economic Reforms, Financial Development and Growth 93
Using the estimated equations next we calculate the contribution of the dif-
ferent factors in explaining the development of the Chilean financial markets. For 
this we divide the sample into two subperiods: 1961-74 and 1986-2005. The first 
subperiod corresponds to the financial repression-cum-government-intervention 
development model, while the second corresponds to the market-oriented develop-
ment model after the pension and banking reforms of 1981 and 1986, respectively. 
Financial development during the first subperiod averaged 17.4% of GDP, while 
during the second it averaged 145.8% of GDP. Of this increase –128.4 percentage 
points of GDP– about 37% is explained by the pension reform of 1981; 25% by 
the reduction in inflation; 20% by the banking reform of 1986, and 19% by other 
structural reforms (Table 12). Thus, it can be concluded that the pension reform 
contributed proportionately more than other reforms and policies to the develop-
ment of the financial sector in Chile.
TABLE 12
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHILE
1986-2005 vs 1961-1974
Explained by:
Absolute change in financial development 
index between 1986-2005 and 1961-74
(% GDP): 128.4
(1) (2) (3)
Pension Reform 33.3% 36.6% 39.9%
Other Structural Reforms 19.2% 18.9% 18.7%
Low Inflation Periods 25.8% 24.7% 25.7%
1986 Banking Sector Reform (α = 0.5) 23.1%
1986 Banking Sector Reform (α = 0.75) 20.7%
1986 Banking Sector Reform (α = 1) 16.7%
Others –0.4% –0.9% –1.0%
Source: Own elaboration.
Next, using the same approach we run similar regressions to identify those 
factors that explain the development of the Chilean banking sector. For this we 
replace the dependent variable for total bank credit (BC) to the private sector, 
also measured as a share of GDP (note that this definition matches the one used 
in the cross-sectional analysis of subsection 6.1). Figure 7 shows the evolution 
of this variable.94 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
As can be seen in the figure, bank credit experienced a boom-bust episode 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which led to the 1981-83 debt–crisis41. One 
consequence of the crisis was that the government had to intervene and take over 
several financial institutions, leading to its controlling of about 60% of the domestic 
banking system. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the debt crisis the government 
implemented several measures to clean up and re-capitalize the financial system. 
For this reason, a significant share of total credit in the years following the debt 
crisis consisted of emergency and soft loans granted under different criteria than 
the ones applied in normal times by a privately run bank. To control for this effect 
we introduce a dummy variable (DCR 81-85) that equals 1.0 during 1981-85 and 
zero otherwise.42, 43 This variable also replaces the previous one that controlled 
for cyclical effects, RERG. In addition, we change the functional form slightly 
by including inflation directly instead of the dummy variables used before. Thus, 
our final specification takes the following form:
(4)  BC PR SR
BR86
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where π is the annual inflation rate, ξt is a random term and the other variables 
are as mentioned above.
FIGURE 7
BANK CREDIT TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Chile 1961-2005 (% GDP)
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006).
41 See De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995).
42 Changing the crisis years changes the estimated coefficients but not the qualitative results, although 
it makes the co-integration relationships less stable.
43 Ideally we would like to run the regression excluding the debt–crisis years, that is, for the post-crisis 
years. But this would imply that we couldn’t properly control for the pension system and banking 
sector reforms of 1981 and 1986, respectively –in particular, the effects of the latter would most likely 
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The results from estimating equation (4), reported in Table 13, are similar 
to those from equation (3). More interestingly, the contributions of the different 
explanatory variables to the development of the banking sector differ from those 
presented earlier that referred to the financial markets. In particular, bank lending 
to the private sector increased from an average of 8.6% of GDP during 1961–74, to 
an average of 60.4% during 1986–2005. Of this increase of 52 percentage points 
of GDP, about 43% is explained by the 1986 reform to the banking sector; 24% 
by other structural reforms; 22% by the 1981 pension reform, and about 7% by 
the reduction in inflation44 (Table 13). Thus, although all the reforms and stabili-
zation policies matter, the banking reform of 1986 becomes more important than 
the pension reform, as expected.
TABLE 13
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT ESTIMATES II
Dependent Variable: Bank credit to the private sector as a share of GDP
(1) (2) (3)
PR 1.191*** 2.444* 3.128*
(1.82) (4.30) (5.92)
SR 0.263* 0.285* 0.294*
(3.83) (4.19) (4.40)








DCR81-85  30.967* 26.881* 24.790*
(9.96) (9.53) (9.36)
Adjusted R-squared 0.97 0.97 0.97
Co-integration test Yes Yes Yes
Note: t  tests are in brackets. *, *** Significant at 1% and 10% level respectively. Yes: Co-integrates 
at 1% significance level according to Mackinnon’s critical values.
44 Note that in this new functional form inflation still has a non–linear effect on the development of 
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TABLE 14
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHILE: 1986-2005 vs 1961-1974
Equation  Explained by:
Absolute change in financial development 
index between 1986-2005 and 1961-74
(% GDP): 51.8
(1) (2) (3)
Pension Reform 11.6% 23.8% 30.5%
Other Structural Reforms 22.8% 24.7% 25.5%
Low Inflation Periods 6.6% 7.0% 7.1%
1986 Banking Sector Reform (α = 0.5) 57.5%
1986 Banking Sector Reform (α = 0.75) 42.6%
1986 Banking Sector Reform (α = 1) 35.1%
Others 1.5% 1.3% 1.8%
Note: Financial development is defined as banks’ total credit to the private sector as a share of GDP.
7.  Final Remarks: The Challenges Ahead for Latin 
America
This paper addresses the issue of explaining the contrasting experience of 
Chile, that during the 1990s grew at high rates and reduced its poverty rate sharply, 
with that of the rest of the Latin American region, that although recovering from 
the very poor performance of the 1980s (the so-called lost decade), failed to resume 
the growth rates of the 1960s and 1970s.
Based on recent theoretical and empirical findings, we argue that Chile’s 
success story is due to the breadth of its reform process, that continues to this 
date and has been much deeper and broader in scope than that carried out in other 
countries. The reform has not only boosted the country’s macro fundamentals 
but also upgraded and strengthened its institutions. The high payoff from Chile’s 
reform is due to its breadth and continuance through time.
Our econometric exercises show the importance of institutions in explaining 
long run economic growth, and this result is very robust to different econometric 
specifications. Indeed, we argue that the better performance of Chile vis-à-vis Latin 
America during the 1990s is explained by both better policies and better institu-
tions in almost equal shares. In addition, we estimate that by having institutions 
of quality similar to Chile’s, the average Latin American country could raise its 
per-capita GDP growth rate by about 1.5%, on average. Time series estimations 
showed that Chile’s 1981 pension reform and 1986 banking sector reform and 
macro stability (reduction in inflation) were critical to foster the development of 
the financial sector and thus accelerate economic growth.
One conclusion that emerges from looking at the Chilean experience is 
straightforward: countries should advance in all fronts, in many cases completing 
the so-called first generation reforms: e.g., fiscal stability, trade liberalization, Economic Reforms, Financial Development and Growth 97
inflation reduction. But there is also the need to advance in second generation 
reforms: upgrading the supervisory and regulatory framework of banks, and re-
forming pension systems. The latter in the case of Chile has proven to be key to 
the attainment of deeper financial markets and higher economic growth.
The need to advance in all these fronts becomes even more urgent given 
the impending globalization trend. In other words, given the increasing (and 
unavoidable) integration of the world economy, in both goods and capital flows, 
countries that do not reform their economies and institutions not only will not reap 
all the benefits from this trend, but will also become increasingly prone to crises. 
It should also be mentioned that the longer countries try to delay –most likely 
unsuccessfully– their integration into the world economy, the larger the income 
gap with the industrial world will be. The latter because in a world of very rapid 
and frequent technological changes, opportunities arise and are exploited quickly 
by the most dynamic and open economy. In sum, the globalization trend presents 
opportunities, but the potential benefits will not materialize if countries do not 
upgrade their institutions and policies.
The above is more easily said than done. This, because there are no short 
cuts and the experience of one country cannot be easily replicated by another; 
what works in one case does not necessarily work in another. So, to make progress 
countries should be innovative in the design of their policies and institutions. Each 
country has to design its own policies and implement them taking into account 
its own characteristics: the way China has proceeded in the past two decades is 
certainly not a replica of the reforms implemented elsewhere. Similarly, Chile’s 
1981 pension reform which, as said, was key to foster the development of the 
country’s financial sector, was not copied from elsewhere; it was brand new and 
started from scratch. Further, countries that have tried to copy the Chilean system, 
however, have not always succeeded because of their own idiosyncrasies. Another 
example is the unremunerated reserve requirement or encaje that Chile used in 
the 1990s that, albeit some controversy about its effectiveness in achieving all the 
objectives for which it was designed, changed the composition of capital inflows 
toward those more stable and with longer maturities, reducing the country’s ex-
posure to capital flight. This policy tool worked in Chile because of the rule of 
law and the tight monitoring exerted by the Central Bank on commercial banks, 
but by its nature is a potential source for corruption.
A second conclusion of the paper, supported by our econometric exercises, 
refers to the importance of other institutions –rule of law, control of corruption, 
government effectiveness, political stability– that are beyond the realm of politi-
cal economy but, nevertheless, affect growth significantly. Although there is no 
straightforward conclusion in this respect, we share the view that these institutions 
are not given and countries are not condemned to their legacy, and the Chilean 
experience confirms it. For instance, in Chile after 30 years of reforms the general 
public has begun to acknowledge the importance of building a strong institutional 
setup to provide and support a market friendly environment with stable rules of the 
game that attracts investors, foreign or domestic. The latter allowed the government 
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which reduces the chances of appointing political allies. Similarly, after about 
25 years since the pension reform, workers (in the formal market) have become 
increasingly aware that their pension depends on their own contributions to their 
retirement funds and not on governmental policies. Therefore, they are much more 
demanding than in the past with regards to transparency, disclosure, regulatory 
issues and other aspects pertaining to the pension fund industry.
Finally, one final challenge of Latin American countries, including Chile, 
is the urgent need to make real progress in social policies, especially those aimed 
at protecting the poorest and unskilled groups. This, because the current speed of 
technological change increasingly demands skilled workers who are more capable 
to adjust to the new technologies. Thus, making progress in the macro, micro and 
institutional fronts to accelerate growth and reap the benefits from the ongoing 
globalization trend is not enough; this must be accompanied by adequate social 
policies –better opportunities to acquiring human capital– to assure that the poor 
are not left behind. Not making progress in improving income distribution could 
undermine public support for the reform process, jeopardizing its continuance 
through time and risking social unrest and major setbacks or worse, reversals.
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